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As interest in renewable energy development continues to rise around the globe, 
the alignment of China’s capabilities and incentive to invest in the green energy sector 
position the country in a leading role. However, China’s recent investment in coal-to-
liquid (CTL) technology raises questions as to the direction of China’s energy policy and 
reflects broader geopolitical tensions within the Chinese government. Although CTL 
technology has been widely criticized as being environmentally unfriendly and 
economically unsustainable, China continues to invest in it at an astounding pace. 
Research proposes several possible explanations, such as corruption or local conflicts of 
interest, however, a critical analysis of China’s political and economic systems reveals 
that China’s energy policy is actually split between pursuing oil security and becoming a 
green hegemon. How the Chinese Communist Party decides to prioritize its energy policy 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 	  
How China’s energy sector is governed will affect global geopolitics for decades 
to come. Despite its widely recognized importance, the subject is often poorly 
understood. Researchers are constantly being surprised by new achievements, trends and 
failures in China’s energy sector.1 China is currently debating how it will meet its 
enormous prospective energy needs, while at the same time maintaining its prospects of 
becoming a green hegemon. The tension between these two contradictory goals has come 
to describe China’s energy sector. At the very crux of this geopolitical struggle lies the 
phenomenon of coal-to-liquid (CTL) technology. CTL challenges the popular perception 
that China’s energy policy is organized around sustainability, while at the same time 
calling attention to the broader economic and political struggles of the Chinese central 
government.  
China has been investing in CTL for over ten years, despite technical difficulties 
and billions of dollars in losses.2 Now, Shenhua Energy Co., a state-owned enterprise and 
the world’s largest power company, is investing 55 billion yuan (7.9 billion U.S. dollars)3 
into a CTL project in Ningxia, and another 280 billion yuan (42.3 billion U.S. dollars) 4 in 
Xinjiang. With this investment, Shenhua will become the first company to use direct CTL 
technology on a large scale since World War II. It is widely accepted that CTL 
technology causes significant harm to the environment, and is not economically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Philip Andrews-Speed, Governance of Energy in China: Transition to a Low-Carbon economy (S.l. 
2 Lucy Hornby, "China’s Coal-Conversion Plants Surge Back to Life," Financial Times, April 12, 2017, 
accessed October 29, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/02931290-1d94-11e7-a454-ab04428977f9. 
3 Yin Chuan, "Significant Coal-to-Liquid Project In Production In Ningxia," Xinhua, December 28, 2016, 
accessed October 29, 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-12/28/c_135939342.htm. 
4 "Shenhua Coal-Chemical base takes shape in Ningxia," China.org, July 7, 2008, accessed November 03, 
2017, http://www.china.org.cn/china/Ningxia/2008-07/07/content_15967894.htm. 
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profitable.5 Indeed, it takes over ten tons of fresh water to produce one ton of coal-
derived fuel.6 In a country plagued with water scarcity, China’s CTL program raises 
substantial questions about its environmental sustainability. Additionally, the price of 
crude oil must be over 55 dollars per barrel for CTL plants to break even, significantly 
limiting potential profit.7  
As interest in renewable energy development continues to rise around the globe,8 
the alignment of China’s capabilities and incentive to invest in the green energy sector 
position the country in a leading role. However, the fact that China is investing so heavily 
in a non-profitable and environmentally harmful technology raises real questions as to the 
direction of China’s energy policy and the Chinese state’s capacity to implement a 
sustainable and economically viable policy to address its energy security concerns. This 
paper seeks to explore why Chinese leadership continues to invest so heavily in CTL 
technology when there are more profitable and environmentally friendly technologies 
available. This is a case that illustrates wider governmental struggles, such as corruption, 
weak state capacity, and bifurcated policy. How the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
decides to prioritize its energy goals could very well determine China’s energy security, 
its global reputation, and the political legitimacy of the CCP. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Lucy Hornby, "China’s Coal-Conversion Plants Surge Back to Life," Financial Times, April 12, 2017, 
accessed October 29, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/02931290-1d94-11e7-a454-ab04428977f9. 
6 Coco Liu, "Chinese companies plunge into coal-to-liquids business, despite water and CO2 problems," 
E&E News, February 23, 2015, , accessed November 20, 2017, 
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060013819. 
7 James T. Bartis, Frank Camm and David S. Ortiz. Producing Liquid Fuels from Coal: Prospects and 
Policy Issues. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008. 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG754.html. 
8 “Renewable energy use rises with China, EU, India giving world hope,” Xinhua, June 10, 
2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-06/10/c_136354044.htm.	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Coal-to-Liquid Technology 
Direct CTL technology is the chemical process of converting coal directly into 
synthetic transportation fuel.9 Unlike original CTL technology used by Nazi Germany 
and South Africa’s Sansol, direct CTL skips gasifying the coal in to synthesis gas, 
making it considerably more efficient. The conversion ratio for direct CTL is 
approximately between one and two-barrels/ton coal. However, for CTL fuels to be 
competitive it is estimated that the price of crude oil must be priced between 55 to 65 
dollars per barrel.10 With the current market price for crude oil hovering around 53 
dollars per barrel, CTL is no longer economically viable.11 During 2008-2009, when 
China first started exploring CTL technology, crude oil prices were at an all-time high, 
approximately 90-100 dollars per barrel. During that time, CTL technology was seen as a 
way to decrease China’s dependence on the international oil market.12 Now, however, oil 
prices are decreasing and the price of domestic coal is increasing. Despite China’s large 
coal reserves, increasing environmental awareness and the importation of coal have 
pushed up its price, further decreasing CTL’s efficiency.13 While CTL projects may 
currently generate a financial profit, studies show that the quantity of net energy 
delivered to society is extremely low,14 due to high initial investment cost and low 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Yang Kong et al., "EROI Analysis for Direct Coal Liquefaction without and with CCS: The Case of the 
Shenhua DCL Project in China," Energies 8, no. 2 (2015): doi:10.3390/en8020786. 
10 James T. Bartis, Frank Camm and David S. Ortiz. “Producing Liquid Fuels from Coal: Prospects and 
Policy Issues. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008. 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG754.html. 
11 “Oil Price Charts.” Oilprice.com. Last modified October 29, 2017. https://oilprice.com/oil-price-
charts/45	  12	  Yang Kong et al., "EROI Analysis for Direct Coal Liquefaction without and with CCS: The Case of the 
Shenhua DCL Project in China," Energies 8, no. 2 (2015): doi:10.3390/en8020786.	  
13 Sarah O. Ladislaw, Jane Nakano. “China-Leader or Laggard on the Path to a Secure, Low-Carbon 
Energy Future?” Center for Stratigic and International Studies, September 2011. 
14 Yang Kong et al., "EROI Analysis for Direct Coal Liquefaction without and with CCS: The Case of the 
Shenhua DCL Project in China," Energies 8, no. 2 (2015): doi:10.3390/en8020786. 
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conversion efficiency.15 Considering these factors, CTL technology remains a 
controversial form of energy production. 
In addition to economic concerns, the CTL process emits large amounts of 
greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. CTL discharges approximately 0.8 tons of carbon 
dioxide per barrel produced.16 Studies estimate that without carbon management the total-
fuel-cycle of CTL is 2.0 to 2.2 times that of emissions created by the refining of 
conventional light crude oils.17 While carbon capture and storage technology can be used 
to control emissions, it also increases production cost by approximately five dollars per 
barrel.18 For example, 6.2 billion yuan (93 million U.S. dollars) was spent on 
environmental protections at the Ningxia plant, equal to 11 percent of the initial 
investment. Furthermore, even the most vigilant carbon management would not 
significantly reduce the negative environmental impacts. Another environmental concern 
associated with CTL plants is water use and pollution. China faces serious water 
shortages, particularly in the northwest desert regions where CTL is being developed. 
The eight million tons of water required each year for Shenhua’s CTL plants, for 
example, further highlights sinking groundwater levels.19 Additionally, Shenhua has 
plans to divert water from the Yellow River, a primary resource for drinking and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Y.H. Henry Chen, John M. Reilly, and Sergey Paltsev, "The prospects for coal-to-liquid conversion: A 
general equilibrium analysis," Energy Policy 39, no. 9 (2011): , doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2011.06.056. 
16 James T. Bartis, Frank Camm and David S. Ortiz. Producing Liquid Fuels from Coal: Prospects and 




19 Nao Nakanishi and Niu Shuping, "China Builds Plant to Turn Coal into barrels of oil," Reuters, June 04, 
2008, accessed October 29, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-ctl/china-builds-plant-to-turn-
coal-into-barrels-of-oil-idUSSP13361320080604. 
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agriculture water, to use for their newest plant.20 These instances show how CTL 
technology will further stretch the already scarce water resources used by over one billion 
people. On its current track, China’s energy production model is unsustainable. There are 
however, alternative options.  
 
Alternative Energy Sources 
Economic and environmental concerns with CTL have caused global skepticism 
towards China’s CTL investment, particularly when there are other more environmentally 
friendly and cost-effective options available.21 Sustainable energy solutions provide an 
economically viable option to meet China’s rising energy needs while avoiding further 
damage to the environment. Renewable energy represents a small but rapidly growing 
share of China’s energy mix. China invested over 100 billion dollars in renewable 
energies in 2015, making it the world’s largest investor in green energy.22 Indeed, China 
has an abundance of green energy resources to draw from. Previous research proposes 
wind energy as an economically competitive alternative to coal for China. According to a 
study done by researchers at Harvard and Tsinghua University, “Assuming a guaranteed 
price of 0.516 RMB/kWh (7.6 U.S. cents) for delivery of electricity to the grid,” wind 
energy could be delivered profitably and accommodate the majority of China’s projected 
electricity demands for 2030.23 As renewable energy technologies advance, wind and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Lucy Hornby, "China’s Coal-Conversion Plants Surge Back to Life," Financial Times, April 12, 2017, 
accessed October 29, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/02931290-1d94-11e7-a454-ab04428977f9. 
21 Jonathan Woetzel and Jiang Kejun, "China's Renewable Energy Revolution," McKinsey Global Institute, 
August 2017, accessed April 14, 2018.  
22 Joel Jaeger, Paul Joffe, and Ranping Song, "China is Leaving the U.S. Behind on Clean Energy 
Investment," World Resources Institute, January 6, 2017, accessed October 31, 2017, 
http://www.wri.org/blog/2017/01/china-leaving-us-behind-clean-energy-investment.	  
23 Michael B McElroy, Xi Lu, Chris P. Nielsen, and Yuxuan Wang. 2009. Potential for wind-generated 
electricity in China. Science 325(5946): 1378-1380. 
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solar become more advantageous. Not only because they reduce pollution, but also 
because they have long-term economic benefits. While Chinese policy makers’ have 
shown considerable interest in renewable energy, recent investment in CTL technology, 
which is neither environmentally friendly nor economically sustainable, represents a 
significant divergence from China’s sustainability efforts. A careful analysis provides 
three possible explanations for this divergence. The first is the vested interests and 
corruption of elites, second is the conflicting goals of local and national governments, 
and lastly is the tension between China’s need for oil security and desire to be a green 
hegemony. 
 
II. CORRUPTION VS NATIONAL INTERESTS 
 
The structure of China’s post-reform economic system and history of corruption 
in state-owned enterprises (SOE) provides one possible explanation for its recent 
investment in CTL technology. Economic decentralization without clarification of 
ownership rights in the post-Tiananmen era led to ruling elites and their friends in the 
private sector taking advantage of opportunities to acquire SOE’s with little 
supervision.24 Additionally, incomplete market reforms give SOE’s privileges and access 
to cheap capital, allowing them to embark on unprofitable projects that benefit 
executive’s personal interests. This combined with greater executive autonomy has 
created a structural gap in which corruption thrives.25 Indeed, one could say that 
corruption is the price China has paid for the transition from a command to a market-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Minxin Pei, China's Crony Capitalism: the Dynamics of Regime Decay (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2016), 24. 
25 Ibid. 
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based economy.26 Despite Xi Jinping’s impressive anti-corruption campaign, corruption 
in large SOE’s such as Shenhua, the largest power SOE in China and company 
responsible for CTL production, remains rampant. The structure of SOE’s creates tension 
for high-ranking executives between personal monetary incentives and wider national 
values. Despite Xi’s recent efforts, evidence suggests that “bribe-taking, embezzlement, 
and unauthorized use of public funds” have risen to astronomical levels since the late 
2000s.27 Researcher Andrew Wedeman proposes that this is because the CCP has adopted 
an informal policy of “selective toleration,” allowing economically beneficial corruption 
while targeting political deviants.28 The unstable relationship between the Chinese 
government and SOE’s means that executives and political leaders are continually 
confronted with opportunities for collusion and corruption.  
The bribery scandal at Shaanxi Electric Power Group provides an example of 
typical corruption activities that take place within large SOE’s. After receiving money 
from the government to upgrade their electric power grid, the executives of the company 
accepted bribes to buy shoddy equipment from suppliers at inflated prices.29 Over 53 
individuals were involved in the scandal and the “president, Wang Wenxue, was 
convicted of taking bribes totaling 7.1 million yuan (one million U.S. dollars).”30 Another 
example, showing the ease with which elites can steal hundreds of thousands of yuan can 
be seen at China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC). Jiang Jiemin, the former chairman of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Andrew Wedeman, Double Paradox: Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 2012) 31.	  
27 Minxin Pei, China's Crony Capitalism: the Dynamics of Regime Decay (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2016), 153. 
28 Andrew Wedeman, Double Paradox: Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 2012) 120. 
29 Minxin Pei, China's Crony Capitalism: the Dynamics of Regime Decay (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2016), 159. 
30 Ibid. 
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CNPC, was accused of taking over 14 million yuan in bribes (2.1 million U.S. dollars).31 
In addition, the energy giant sold the oil field property rights below market price to Zhou 
Yongkang’s (former Politburo Standing Committee member, party chief of Sichuan 
province, and head of CNPC) eldest son, who flipped the fields for a profit of over 550 
million yuan (83 million U.S. dollars).32 These examples of coercion and bribery have 
become the new normal in China’s reformed capitalist economy and result in significant 
economic and social damage to the state. 
Considering rampant patterns of corruption, it is not difficult to deduce that 
investment in CTL was not the actions of a misguided national government, but rather of 
self-interested elites within Shenhua Energy Co. itself. Shenhua is China’s largest energy 
SOE with a market capital of approximately 400 billion yuan (60 billion U.S. dollars).33 
Based on a report done in 2014, corruption is most common in large SOE’s because they 
conduct high-value transactions, and therefore create easy targets for potential 
corruption.34 The larger the SOE the easier it is to find partners in collusion, reduce risk, 
and steal large sums of money without notice. Shenhua’s CTL project can be analyzed 
using similar tactics. The project has attracted enormous amounts of investment and has a 
large profit margin providing many opportunities for personal gain. While it is impossible 
to make definitive conclusions, Shenhua’s CTL project fits all of the dimensions required 
for corruption to thrive. CTL provides ample opportunities for individual gain through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Ibid.	  
32 Ibid. 
33 "China Shenhua Energy Co Ltd (601088.SS)," Reuters, accessed November 02, 2017, 
https://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/overview/601088.SS. 
34 中国企业家犯罪研究报告 2014 [Report on crimes of Chinese corporate executives in 2014]. 
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contract biding, embezzlement and personnel management.35 Therefore, vested 
individuals face a coincidence of interest, do they stay loyal to China’s publically stated 
sustainable energy goals or do they utilize CTL’s large profit margin for their own 
benefit? 
Shenhua’s leadership has a track record of pursuing personal gain over broader 
regime goals. Zhang Xiwu, Shenhua’s chairman before being appointed the director of 
the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), the 
government committee responsible for overseeing SOE’s, was recently arrested for 
corruption.36 While the exact reasons for his arrest have not been reported he was accused 
of abusing his position for personal and family benefit and being involved in various 
forms of illegal profiteering. His arrest in July 2017 is thought to be linked with earlier 
corruption investigations in the Shenhua group. In 2014 anti-corruption investigators 
announced the arrest of several top Shenhua executives, including assistant general 
manager Zhang Wenjiang37 and vice president Hua Ziqiao.38  Shortly after, the anti-
corruption agency proclaimed that the senior leaders of Shenhua where suspected of 
corruption, and sporadic arrests continued for several years. These arrests further solidify 
the hypothesis that corruption may also play a role in Shenhua’s latest investment 
strategy. While CTL may not benefit China as a whole, or even be in line with national 
environmental policies, it does benefit a few powerful individuals. Considering 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Minxin Pei, China's Crony Capitalism: the Dynamics of Regime Decay (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2016), 153.	  
36 Lary Ong, "Former Chinese State Asset Regulator Deputy Head Purged," Epoch Times, July 03, 2017, 
accessed November 02, 2017, https://www.theepochtimes.com/former-chinese-state-asset-regulator-
deputy-head-purged_2264226.html. 
37 Ibid. 
38 "Former executives of China's Shenhua energy under investigation," Reuters, December 23, 2014, 
accessed November 02, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/china-corruption-shenhua/former-executives-
of-chinas-shenhua-energy-under-investigation-idUSL3N0U72B720141223. 	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Shenhua’s corrupt history and weak bureaucratic structure, it is easy to conclude that 
CTL production is merely the doing of a few high-level executives looking to expedite 
their own financial gain.  
While corruption is one explanation for China’s recent investment in CTL 
technology, this argument is inconclusive due to insufficient evidence linking Shenhua 
Energy Co.’s current projects to exploitation. It is possible for the interests of elites to 
sustain an inefficient enterprise, however, it is much more difficult to start an entire 
industry for the purposes of corruption. This would require corrupt elites taking on much 
more risk than is necessary. Although the potential personal income from CTL is huge, 
there are other industries in which corruption would be easier and less risky. The lack of 
proof and the large logistical risk means that even if corruption has played a small role, 
there are more compelling political motivations that better explain investment in CTL.  
 
III. LOCAL VS NATIONAL INTERESTS  
 
Another possible explanation for investing in CTL technology is the conflict of 
interests between local and state governments. Generalized, non-province specific 
policies from Beijing have caused a misalignment of interests between local and state 
governments making it difficult for the CCP to enforce policies in distant regions. The 
saying ‘山高皇帝远’, ‘The mountains are high and the emperor is far away’ has come to 
describe the common phenomenon of local officials acting independently despite policy 
direction from Beijing.39 While very few officials question the fundamental structure of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Richard McGregor, The Party: the Secret World of China's Communist Rulers (Harper Collins 
Publishers, 2010). 
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one-party rule, the everyday economic administration of China requires an altogether 
different calculus. Richard McGregor describes that instead of, “surging out like a single 
river out of the capital, the transmission of economic management is more akin to a series 
of locks, in which each locality takes what they want out of the policy waterway.”40 
While sustained economic growth and environmental issues are important to China as a 
whole, local governments are more likely to act in their own best interest. Prioritizing 
short-term local problems such as enterprise cash flow difficulties, attracting investment, 
and social stability concerns.41 CTL projects attract investment from Beijing and provide 
employment, two key pieces to a sustainable provincial government. This encourages 
local officials to sustain an inefficient industry, and ignore national green energy targets. 
The conflict of interest between Beijing and local governments is not new to 
China. Indeed, one of the reasons Beijing’s generalized policies have been successful at 
all is because each locality adjusts it to their own needs. However, this also means that 
local governments will avoid implementing national environmental and economic 
policies that are impractical or harmful to their organizational interests.42 Local officials, 
who deal with real problems of livelihood and job creation, will often ignore broad state 
policies. The widespread misalignment of interests indicates that the continuation of CTL 
may not be a reflection of national energy policies but rather the interests of local 
governments.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Ibid, 173.	  
41 Genia Kostka, and William Hobbs. “Local Energy Efficiency Policy Implementation in China: Bridging 
the Gap between National Priorities and Local Interests.” The China Quarterly 211 (2012): 765–85. 
doi:10.1017/S0305741012000860. 
42 Minxin Pei, China's Crony Capitalism: the Dynamics of Regime Decay (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2016), 26. 
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A study done by Tim Wright on a 1998 policy initiative called, ‘Closing the pits 
and reducing coal production’ provides an excellent example of this phenomenon.43 The 
goal of this policy was to close down township and village enterprise (TVE) mines to 
correct China’s coal safety record and to reduce output, therefore balancing supply and 
demand.44 The environmental and safety effect of the small mines were not only giving 
China bad face, they also detracted from the economic development of larger, more 
efficient SOE mines. The target was to close 25,800 TVE mines and reduce output by 
250 million tons by the end of 1999.45 However, officials soon discovered that people 
who were dependent on the TVE mines for their livelihood resisted the policy. Many 
local authorities feared that the policy would wreak havoc on their county’s economy and 
social order. Officials did not want to be responsible for the economic downfall of their 
region so they would express support for the policy in public, but do nothing in reality.46 
Therefore, while on paper many mines were closed, they reopened illegally as soon as the 
investigator’s backs were turned. Similarly, these kinds of tensions can be applied to the 
CTL situation. While local governments may agree in theory with China’s environmental 
energy platform, continuing local CTL production simply brings in more revenue and 
meets the more urgent needs of local regions.  
Although CTL production benefits local economies by creating jobs and attracting 
investment, it is ultimately a betrayal of China’s national energy goals. China’s 
Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC’s), decided upon during the Paris Climate 
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Agreement, publicly state China’s commitment to environmentalism. Pledging that, 
“China attaches great importance to addressing climate change since long making it a 
significant national strategy for its social and economic development and promoting 
green and low-carbon development as an important component of the ecological 
civilization process.”47 It is clear that China has committed to using low-carbon 
technology. Indeed, earlier this year Xi vowed that China will, “stick to the basic state 
policy of energy conservation and environmental protection.”48 Considering such 
rhetoric, the use of CTL technology, a large carbon emitter, represents a considerable 
irregularity. While the national government is concerned with green energy and fulfilling 
international environmental contracts, local governments are pursuing CTL as a 
moneymaking opportunity.  
The investment being poured into these localities are enormous; a quoted 280 
billion yuan (42.3 billion U.S. dollars) is being invested into the coal chemical base in 
Ningxia alone.49 Additionally, it is estimated that the Ningxia plant will create 30,000 
jobs and will increase local incomes by 18 billion RMB per annum by 2020.50 Ceasing 
CTL production would cause these regions to lose jobs and the backbone of their local 
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economy. Consequently, localities continue to push for various projects as part of their 
plans to increase local GDP.51  
At a basic level, the discontinuity between the central government’s strategic 
goals and local government’s operational intentions reflects China’s weak state capacity. 
CTL production is allowed to persist because of the interests of various local players, 
despite its contradiction to national goals. However, this does not provide ample 
explanation as to why the Chinese government re-initialized CTL production. Indeed, 
flaws in this argument can be found when looking at the water needs of these specific 
regions. CTL plants must be placed near large coal reserves, however, the majority of 
China’s coal reserves are located in Northern China, which is facing extreme water 
shortages.52 Indeed, Northern China is home to 43 percent of China‘s population but only 
14 percent of the country’s water supply.53 The Yellow River, also the water source for 
China’s five largest CTL plants, has already been depleted 76 percent by human use.54 
CTL production will only further exacerbate extreme water shortages. The vice general 
manager of Shenhua, Zhang Yuzhuo, estimated that to meet CTL water demands for his 
company alone would require one percent of the Yellow River’s water.55 Although the 
accuracy of this statement is questionable, it gives an idea of just how large the impact of 
CTL will be on a region already facing extreme water scarcity.  
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This has already had an effect on local communities. For example, the Ningxia 
plant redirects water previously used for 2,000-year-old rice patties, putting many 
farmers out of work.56 While these communities may not be large, they hold considerable 
sway in China’s rural population, where many CTL plants are based. It is unlikely that 
local government officials would risk further worsening an already exacerbated water 
shortage, threatening the livelihoods of tens of millions throughout the region.57 
Therefore, while misalignment of interests’ certainty provides a partial 
explanation for sustaining the CTL industry, this argument fails to explain the support 
coming out of the central government itself. This paper explores the entrenched interests 
and geopolitical tensions rampant in China’s national energy policy and will argue that 
investing in CTL is a way for China to balance its desire to have oil security and become 
a green energy hegemon.  
 
IV. GREEN ENERGY HEGEMON VS OIL SECURITY 
 
Although both individual and local interests can be seen as contributing factors in 
CTL production, they both rely on the assumption that the central government’s 
commitment is to green energy and economic efficiency. In fact, it is not that the Chinese 
government is unable to pursue its interests, rather the evidence suggests that the 
overriding political motivations of the central government are split and even conflictual 
with each other. China’s investment in CTL technology reflects a tension within the CCP 	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itself between a geopolitical desire to be a green energy leader and increased oil security, 
which would help support the energy needs of China’s high-intensity growth model. 
Decades of fast economic growth have created a demand for energy that has outstripped 
domestic supply.58 And the production of transportation fuels from coal has become an 
alternative option to lessen the deficiency in petroleum supply.59 China sees CTL 
production as a possible solution to its energy security crisis, by taking a readily available 
energy source, coal, and transforming it into crude oil. At the same time, China is taking 
on a new environmentalist leadership role after the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris 
Climate Agreement. These two contradicting goals have placed China in a difficult 
position, and the CCP is desperately avoiding choosing between them. The production of 
CTL provides a way for China to appease both its oil needs and its desire to become a 
green leader. Although it may only be for a short time, CTL has allowed the Party to ease 
the growing geopolitical tension between energy security and green leadership. 
 
Oil Security  
Energy supply is critical for China’s sustained economic growth and social 
stability, however, China’s current crude oil supply situation is precarious. As energy 
consumption increases domestic resources will be unable to meet China’s rising demand. 
China’s dependence on imported oil is projected to reach 76.9 percent by 2020 and 82 
percent by 2030.60 This growing dependency on foreign oil is both a theoretical and 
practical challenge for China. From a theoretical standpoint, reliance on imported oil 
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violates Mao’s doctrine of self-reliance (自力更生), a guiding economic principle of 
socialist China.61 This does not require complete self-reliance, however, it implies that 
the government should hold significant control over domestic energy systems.62 China’s 
oil consumption has skyrocketed in the past decade63 and requires sufficient oil to fuel its 
high-intensity economic growth model without the risks involved with being reliant on 
the global market. Indeed, researcher Zhang Wenmu goes so far as to say that 
international oil dependence is “the Achilles heel to contemporary China, as it has forced 
China to trust its fate (stable markets and access to resources) to others.”64 Whatever the 
analogy, it is clear that energy security and oil independence are precursors to China’s 
global rise, and must be addressed.  
China’s geopolitical desire for oil independence is threefold. First, China has a 
deep-seated historically based fear of foreign oil dependence. Secondly, it distrusts the 
international oil market. Lastly, the CCP sees oil sustainability is a precursor to China’s 
sustained economic growth and therefore Party legitimacy.   
The first reason behind China’s desire to be oil independent requires a deeper 
understanding of historical context. The Chinese government’s unease with its status as a 
net importer of oil originates with Soviet participation in China’s energy sector during the 
1950s.65 Soviet advisors had a major impact in developing China’s oil industry after the 
CCP took power, and their departure following the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s left 
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China floundering.66 The abrupt departure seriously damaged some of the large-scale 
energy projects they had been collaborating on. As a result, China became reliant on the 
Soviets for over 50 percent of its refined oil products.67 This, combined with the Great 
Leap Forward movement resulted in massive economic collapse. China blamed the 
catastrophe entirely on the Soviet Union for abandoning them in their hour of need and 
made accelerated efforts to become oil self-sufficient.68 These experiences made Chinese 
leadership acutely aware of the importance of oil security on economic and geopolitical 
power. Even now, the Chinese government sees economic independence as an essential 
part of sustainable development. In his speech to the 19th Communist Party Congress, Xi 
Jinping said that to further economic development China must, “reform and open up, be 
self-reliant, hardworking and enterprising.”69 Although China has come a long way in 
opening up its economy, there remains an inherent distrust in the global market. Now that 
China is once again a net-importer of oil, these fears have come to the forefront of 
China’s energy policy.   
The second reason for China’s pursuit of oil independence is the Chinese 
government’s wariness of international actors’ huge influence in the oil market. The 
Chinese government is troubled that the U.S., Japan, and Western Europe allies have 
dominance over Middle Eastern oil and could potentially use this influence to keep China 
in “check”.70 China fears that U.S. dominance over the world oil market could work to 
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weaken China by controlling energy resources and limiting China’s access to oil.71 One 
example of this is the U.S.’ close ties with oil supplying states, such as Saudi Arabia. 
Additionally, the U.S. Navy dominates the sea-lanes stretching from the Persian Gulf to 
the South China Sea, where the majority of China’s oil imports must pass through.72 This 
means that the U.S. could disrupt or even block the majority of China’s oil supply with 
relative ease, crippling its economy. Furthermore, while not specifically identified by 
Chinese leadership, it is possible that the U.S. could apply oil sanctions against China to 
punish behavior they dislike.73 Differences in the two countries political values 
concerning human rights, arms sales, or cross-strait relations provide ample possibilities 
for this kind of rebuke.  
To minimize such dangers, China has been pursuing its own oil diplomacy in the 
Middle East. This diplomacy strengthens and diversifies China’s ties with oil producing 
nations and complicates those with oil importing nations.74 However, these actions have 
been met with mixed results. In some instances, it provided an opportunity for increased 
cooperation. In others, it quickly escalated into a neo-mercantilist approach of locking up 
energy supplies, thus sparking further instability of energy resources.75 This has 
encouraged increased domestic efforts for oil self-sufficiency. This distrust of the global 
market and fear of international intervention has caused China to look to alternative oil 
production methods, such as CTL, for a more permanent solution.  
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Lastly, China needs oil security to continue its pattern of high economic growth 
and ensure the CCP’s political legitimacy. Historically, in the reign of Mao, the Chinese 
government drew its legitimacy solely from its strong commitment to socialism. 
However, when Deng Xiaoping took power in 1978 he knew this was no longer sufficient 
to appease the general populace and introduced China’s “opening up and reform” 
economic campaign.76 From then on the CCP has relied on performance-based legitimacy 
to secure its own political future. Only by constantly improving economic growth and 
social welfare does the CCP reinforce its own authority. However, China’s slowing 
economic growth since 2012 means that this legitimacy is under attack.77 China needs a 
reliable source of crude oil to continue its rapid economic growth and secure its own 
political future. Without this, institutional failures, such as the healthcare system, lack of 
government transparency, and rampant corruption will come to light, sparking 
widespread social discontent.78 China’s development of CTL provides the crude oil China 
desperately needs, particularly for its transportation sector, which is essential to 
continued economic growth. 
The importance of oil security in sustaining China’s growth pattern cannot be 
underestimated. Gross domestic product (GDP) grew at a rate of 9.8 percent per year 
from 1985-1995 and is expected to average 6.6 percent per year until 2020.79 Along with 
this impressive economic growth, China’s energy consumption has also increased. Total 
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primary energy consumption increased from less than 18 quadrillion Btu in 1980 to 37 
quadrillion Btu in 1996. It is now projected to reach over 98 quadrillion Btu by 2020, 
equal to energy consumption levels in the United States.80 While most this consumption 
is still in the form of coal, oil is taking up an increasingly large portion. Indeed, oil 
consumption is projected to reach 8.8 million barrels per day (mb/d) by 2020, a large 
increase from 3.5 mb/d in 1996.81 The CCP must find a way to provide this oil or risk a 
decrease in economic growth. CTL technology provides a way to meet this growing 
demand. By transforming China’s surplus of coal into valuable oil, CTL helps sustain 
economic growth and improve energy security without relying on more imports. 
Although CTL is financially inefficient, it is the only feasible way for China to 
significantly increase its oil production, therefore lessening its dependence on the global 
oil market. In more ways than one, the future of China’s political and economic stability 
depends on increasing its oil security. This analysis sheds new light on the importance of 
the role of CTL in relation to the broader positionality of the Chinese government.  
The Chinese government has turned to CTL as a way to ease the tension between 
its geopolitical desire to increase oil security and to become a global green power. 
Although contradictory both are essential to ensuring China’s socioeconomic stability 
and global progress. At the same time, China must prove its commitment to 
environmentalism in order to legitimatize the CCP’s power on a global scale. Although 
CTL is not necessarily the most economically efficient or environmentally friendly 
option, it provides a way for China to reduce its coal use, therefore progressing its goal as 
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a clean energy leader, and provides valuable oil needed to continue economic growth and 
achieve oil sustainability.  
 
Altering Environmental Impact 
China has shown consistent desire to become a green energy leader. Pursuing 
green leadership not only gives China heightened moral authority on the global stage, it 
also provides a pathway to increased geopolitical power. CTL technology can help China 
achieve this by lessening its dependence on coal, despite CTL’s various other 
environmental concerns. China has more to gain from green energy development than 
any other country in the world. Now, analysts believe the Trump administration’s 
decision to pull out of the Paris Climate Agreement has gifted China an opportunity to 
improve its economy, quality of life and international position. Paul Haenle, who served 
on the National Security Council under Barack Obama, went so far as to say that the 
decision gave China a “geopolitical win”.82 In president Xi’s speech to the 19th 
Communist Party Congress he promised that China would take a “driving seat in 
international cooperation to respond to climate change.”83 Additionally, China has 
stipulated in several international agreements its concrete goals to reduce coal use. If it 
does not fulfill these promises it could pose challenges to China’s economy, international 
reputation, and political legitimacy. CTL provides a way for China to decrease its coal 
use, producing less direct air pollution, therefore staying in line with international 
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agreements, while still making use of its large coal reserves and providing a stable energy 
source for its ever-growing economy. China’s desire to become a green energy leader is 
motivated both internally, by growing health and economic concerns, and externally 
through China’s desire to become a global political force, which can be seen through its 
participation in international climate agreements.  
Despite China’s clear desire to become an international green leader its coal 
consumption habits and heavy pollution pose large barriers to China’s ability to play that 
role. Not only will it have long-term impacts on worker health and economic growth, it 
also delegitimizes China’s desire to become a green hegemon. China’s industrial rise has 
made it the highest emitter of carbon in the world. This has subjected Chinese citizens to 
significant health risks. In 2012, “PM2.5 particulate pollutants…were linked to 670,000 
premature deaths from strokes, lung cancer” and various other pollutant related 
illnesses.84 The declining health of the workforce due to pollutants has also resulted in 
significant economic impacts. A study done by RAND Cooperation estimated that in 
2012 air pollution cost China 535 billion dollars, or 6.5 percent of its GDP, due to loses 
in labor activity.85  
Patterns of declining health and personal financial loss have also resulted in 
increased social discontent. According to the Council on Foreign Relations “between 
1995 and 2010, the number of environment-related petition letters increased from 58,678 to 
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701,073.”86 Increased social discontent carries serious implications for the stability of the 
CCP. The Chinese government does not see green energy development as a moral 
responsibility, but rather as a way to mitigate socioeconomic instability and as a new 
source of economic growth. China has a lot to gain internally from enforcing sustainable 
energy methods and developing green technology, however the main reason for China’s 
pursuit of green energy is as a pathway to increased geopolitical power. This can be seen 
through the Chinese government’s participation in international agreements and rhetoric. 
Externally, China desires to use green energy hegemony as a pathway to 
increased global influence. China has placed itself under considerable global 
expectations, and not fulfilling these expectations would work to delegitimize China’s 
grab for geopolitical power. This pressure comes from commitments made in 
international agreements, and expectations of international media and environmentalists. 
The Paris Climate Agreement––under which 188 countries committed to limiting climate 
change––is the most prominent example of China’s internationally proclaimed 
commitment to mitigating climate change.87 China’s intended nationally determined 
contributions (NDC), created as part of the Paris Climate Agreement state that China 
will, “control coal consumption” and “expand the use of natural gas” by 2030.88  To help 
achieve this goal China set a national coal cap target of 4.2 billion tons by 2020 as part of 
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its National Energy Development Strategy Action Plan.89 This means that provinces and 
localities that use a lot of coal such as, Beijing, Hebei, and Tianjin all have local coal 
capping targets and plans. China’s push to reduce its carbon emissions is motivated by its 
need to legitimize itself as a leader on the global stage. Large commitments made in the 
Paris Agreement reflect China’s desire to be considered as a moral and political authority 
at an international level. The U.S. pull out of the Paris Agreement has not only placed 
China in a position of heightened authority, it has also increased the pressure for China to 
fulfill its environmental goals.  
China’s desire for environmental leadership can also be seen through the rhetoric 
used by political leaders. In Xi Jinping’s address to the 19th Communist Party Congress 
he used the word “environment” and other related terms 89 times.90 Meanwhile, the word 
“economy” was only used 70 times, dropping from 104 times five years ago.91 Xi used 
his speech to reaffirm China’s commitments to green energy and environmentalism. 
Saying that China will continue initiatives to, “do better when it comes to conservation, 
and develop eco-friendly families, schools, communities and transport services.”92 Under 
Xi, the government has placed a high priority on lowering levels of smog and promoting 
green energy. Xi’s commitment to green energy and smog reduction satisfies 
international pressure for China to become a green leader after the U.S. pullout for the 
Paris Climate Agreement, and works to further legitimize the Chinese government in the 	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eyes of the international community. Although CTL is a large emitter of carbon dioxide, 
it allows China to significantly reduce its coal emissions, a concrete goal China stated in 
the Paris Climate Agreement. CTL is a manifestation of the CCP’s inability to prioritize 
its energy policy goals. In this way, CTL is not a mistaken tangent of China’s energy 
policy as other theories may suggest, but actually an intentional compromise between two 
geopolitical goals. China’s energy strategy simply cannot be understood without a careful 
analysis of the many ingrained geopolitical goals of the CCP. Such forces require, in-





The production of CTL technology is not costless. China’s investment in CTL has 
economic, environmental, and political implications for China’s future and international 
image. Economically, CTL has both positive and negative implications. On the one hand, 
the central government is required to dish out enormous investments for something that 
has questionable financial profitability and limited returns. Furthermore, putting such 
enormous pressure on China’s coal reserves runs the risk of prematurely depleting those 
reserves, leading to either energy shortages or increased coal imports from Indonesia and 
Australia.93 On the other hand, CTL projects can help stimulate economic growth in 
localities and potentially provide opportunities for those relying on subsistence farming 
to join China‘s modern economy.  
CTL also has large environmental implications. Not only will CTL production 
undoubtedly release large amounts of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere it will also 	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contribute to widespread water contamination. The effects of such environmental 
degradation on the living conditions of those in the margins of CTL projects cannot be 
underestimated. Developing an industry that increases water consumption by 200 to 500 
million tons per year in one of China’s most arid regions is a dangerous proposition.94 
Were China to experience water shortages in the northwest or along the Yellow River, it 
would cause unrest, migration and an inevitable increase in food and grain imports. 
Additionally, it is unclear if those who rely on water for irrigation will be treated fairly, 
or compensated for water lost to CTL development. Although CTL allows China to 
lessen its coal use, there is no doubt that is will contribute to irreversible environmental 
damage in other ways. 
Investment in CTL and the pursuit of contradictory energy goals also affects 
China’s image as an environmental leader. Beijing is not blind to the fact that its energy 
policy is under the watchful eyes of the rest of the world.95 Local and foreign media have 
started to erode China’s image as an environmental leader, using CTL production as a 
way to question the validity of China’s wider energy policy direction. Although energy 
analysts tend to focus on China’s massive renewable energy expansion and view the 
nation as a global energy leader,96 CTL has worked to create a more controversial 
opinion. Indeed, reviews of China’s CTL use have been all but positive. An article in the 
Financial Times calls China’s CTL projects “water-guzzling coal-conversion plants.”97 A 
report compiled by Chinese energy experts warned that the “Chinese government and 	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investors should be prudent when developing it [CTL technology]” due to economic and 
health concerns. 98 Furthermore, observation of popular social media sites, such as 
Twitter, reveals widespread criticisms. Water News Global tweeted that China’s “Coal-
to-liquid conversion plan would worsen #GlobalWarming.”99 Another user commented, 
“Factories that transform coal into liquid fuels may ensure China continues to foul the air 
and water with pollution.”100 By using CTL technology China risks losing its image as an 
environmental leader and therefore any soft power that comes with that.  
It is no secret that China wishes to broaden its scope of international influence. In 
his speech to the 19th Communist Party Congress, Xi remarked that China must succeed 
in its goal to “become a global leader in terms of composite national strength and 
international influence.”101 China sees pursuing green hegemony as its best growth 
option. Not only does it protect the government’s political legitimacy it also provides an 
opportunity for greater geopolitical power and a new economic growth. China is 
currently using its greening efforts as a platform on which to base much if its foreign 
policy and energy diplomacy. However, these efforts conflict with China’s increasing 
need for oil independence. Contradictory energy policies weaken China’s green energy 
platform, causing the state to look weak and indecisive. CTL provides a peek into the 
mind of the CCP, where it is possible to detect wider struggles within the Chinese 
political inner circle, such as corruption, weak state capacity, and bifurcated policy.  	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This essay has used the evolution of CTL in China as a central point against 
which to examine the different and contradictory drivers of China’s energy policy. This 
phenomenon could be understood from an institutionalist perspective, by connecting CTL 
production to corruption and weak state capacity. However, I argue it is not that the 
Chinese government is unable to pursue its geopolitical desires, but rather that the 
overriding political motivations behind China’s energy policy are split. On the one hand, 
the CCP desires to become a global green hegemon and environmental technology leader. 
On the other hand, it is necessary to secure China’s oil supply for continued economic 
growth through becoming oil independent. The confrontation of these two contradicting 
priorities can be seen manifested in the production of CTL technology. CTL provides a 
way to appease both of China’s objectives without having to choose one over the other.  
The interplay between China’s two predominant geopolitical goals in the making 
of energy policy raises real questions about the integrity and future of China’s energy 
policy. As the world’s largest energy consumer, and one of the fastest growing 
economies in the world, China will influence the global energy market and global 
emissions no matter what decision the government makes.102 As China’s domestic and 
international circumstances evolve, so will the need for CTL. For example, an oil shock 
or an escalation in tensions between the U.S. and China could push China to increase the 
importance of energy security, and by extension the CTL industry. Or, an extended 
drought that leads to social unrest in Northern China could lead to coal-to-oil 
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development falling out of favor.103 How the CCP decides to prioritize its energy policy 
goals could very well determine the future international reputation of China, as well as 
the health and stability of its economy. The increasing tension in China’s energy sector 
foreshadows the central challenges that China will face in the coming decade as the 
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